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Rhode: Legal Ethics in an Adversary System: The Persistent Questions

LEGAL ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM:

THE PERSISTENT QUESTIONS
Deborah L. Rhode*
It is a particular pleasure to be among so many friends and
distinguished colleagues, and to have an occasion to honor one of the
founding fathers of our field. As many of you doubtless noted, my title is
a variation on two of Professor Freedman's earliest and widely
influential works.' This event is a fitting occasion for reflection on what
has changed and what has remained the same during the last four
decades since the first of these works appeared. A brief keynote address
cannot, of course, chronicle the evolution of the entire field of legal
ethics. But it does provide an opportunity to trace several themes that
have been central to contemporary debates and to Professor Freedman's
own contributions: autonomy, access, and accountability. First, what is
the role of client autonomy in the adversary system, and how does it
compare with other values? Second, what are the challenges of
practicing in a system that enshrines equal access to justice in principle,
but violates it routinely in practice? And finally, how do we ensure an
appropriate measure of public accountability for professional conduct?
Let me begin with a personal reminiscence, which may cheer some
who toil in this specialty and occasionally wonder whether it ever makes
a difference. When I was in law school at Yale in the late 1970s,
Professor Freedman came to debate Geoffrey Hazard on the subject of
much of his early work: the tension between lawyers' responsibilities to
* Ernest W. McFarland Professor of Law, Director of the Center on Ethics, Stanford
University. B.A., J.D. Yale University. Where this lecture draws on recent publications, including
Deborah L. Rhode, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004), and PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE

(2005), the footnotes will refer to those works without replicating their extensive references. The
author is grateful to David Luban and Alan Dershowitz for comments on an earlier version of this
lecture.
1. See generally MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM
(1975) [hereinafter FREEDMAN, ADVERSARY SYSTEM]; Monroe H. Freedman, Professional
Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV.
1469 (1966).
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their clients and to the pursuit of truth. Even at this distance of three
decades, I can still recall this dialogue as a pivotal moment in my own
career. I remember thinking: "This is really interesting. Why haven't we
been talking about it in law school?" Yale at the time taught legal ethics
by the pervasive method, and as in so many institutions, this kind of
extracurricular event was as pervasive as it got. That debate helped steer
me down the path that ends up here. I have no doubt that Professor
Freedman's work has touched many in this field in similar ways, and I
am grateful for this public occasion to say how much his contributions
have meant, personally and professionally to us all.
I.

AUTONOMY: CLIENT LOYALTY AND COMPETING VALUES

One of the most central issues in legal ethics has always been the
importance of client autonomy and the responsibilities it imposes on
lawyers. Professor Freedman, early on, staked out one of the strongest
defenses of this value, and of attorneys' unqualified loyalty to client
interests. In essence, his position has been that attorneys are morally
accountable "for the decision to accept a particular client or cause" and
for counseling the client "regarding the moral aspects of the
representation.,, 2 But, according to Freedman, once a lawyer "chooses to
represent a client, . . . it would be immoral as well as unprofessional for

the lawyer, either by concealment or coercion, to deprive the client of
lawful rights that the client elects to pursue ....

",

The rationale is that

respect for individual dignity and autonomy is a defining feature of a
free society, and of an adversarial system of justice that protects the
society's core values.4 On this view, which is reflected and reinforced by
bar ethical codes, the best way to protect individual rights and pursue
truth is through a clash of opposing advocates, who represent their
clients' interests as their clients perceive them. As Freedman
summarizes the argument:
The adversary system thereby gives both form and substance to the
humanitarian ideal of the dignity of the individual. The central concern

of a system of professional ethics, therefore, should be to strengthen
individual human dignity within the
the role of the lawyer in enhancing
5
adversary system of justice.

2.

MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 87 (2d ed.

2002).
3. Id.
4. Seeid.at20-21.
5. Id. at 49.
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This obligation "to serve the undivided interests of individual
clients" is not, of course, without qualification.6 Much of the
contemporary debate on legal ethics within the American bar in general
and the professional responsibility community in particular has been
over how to define the exceptions. Over the last quarter century, the
primary trend, both in theory and in practice, has been toward greater
qualification of client loyalty, but the results have been uneven and often
unsatisfying to both supporters and opponents of the trend. In some
areas, reformers seem to have struck a workable compromise; in others,
the controversy is likely to escalate.
At the theoretical level, a growing number of professional
responsibility scholars, myself among them, has challenged the priority
traditionally given to client autonomy in civil contexts as compared with
other ethical concerns. From this perspective, the rationale for
unqualified partisanship has force in criminal cases, but on grounds that
are not applicable to most other arenas of legal practice. "Individuals
whose lives, liberty, and reputation are at risk" have special need of "an
advocate without competing loyalties. '7 Constitutional protections of
due process and prohibitions on governmental abuse would mean little
without a lawyer prepared to assert them. The prospect of a vigorous
defense provides necessary incentives for law enforcement officials to
respect individual rights and to investigate facts thoroughly. Providing
uncompromised advocacy for all defendants, including those who are
guilty, is a crucial means of protecting those who are not.s
The justifications for such advocacy are much weaker in civil cases.
Legal philosophers such as David Luban have noted that promoting
client autonomy does not have intrinsic value. Its importance rests on the
other values that it fosters, such as personal initiative and social
responsibility. 9 If a particular client's objective does little to advance
such values or does so only at much greater cost to third parties, then
unqualified loyalty lacks moral justification. That is especially likely
when the client is not an individual, but a profit-driven organization, and
6. Id. at 10.
7. DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 54 (2000) [hereinafter RHODE,
JUSTICE].
8. See id at 55; see also David Luban, Are CriminalDefenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV.

1729, 1762-66 (1993) (arguing that unqualified advocacy is more justifiable in criminal than civil
contexts).
9. See David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client
Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1004, 1037-41 (1990); David Luban,
The LysistratianPrerogative:A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 637, 639;
see also JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 381 (1986).
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the victims are individuals whose health, safety, and autonomy are
inadequately represented. On this view, client trust, autonomy, and
confidentiality are entitled to weight, but they must be balanced against
other equally important concerns. Lawyers also have responsibilities to
prevent unnecessary harm to third parties, to promote a just and effective
legal system, and to respect core values such as honesty, fairness, and
good faith on which this system depends.' 0
Influential early writing on legal ethics focused on several areas
where those values have been in conflict: clients' perjury, fraud, and
other socially injurious misconduct. At issue have been competing
concerns: the need to preserve sufficient trust and candor in lawyerclient relationships to ensure effective representation, and the need to
promote sufficient commitments to truth, fairness, and concern for third
parties to ensure an effective legal system.
Dilemmas involving client perjury no longer provoke much
controversy, largely because the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
have struck a pragmatic compromise. Rule 3.3 prohibits offering
"evidence that the lawyer knows to be false" and requires "reasonable
remedial measures" if the lawyer "comes to know of [the] falsity" of
material evidence that he or she has offered." This approach offers
something for everyone; it symbolically affirms one of the competing
values-truth-without seriously impairing the other-client trust.
Lawyers who reject the Rule's symbolic priorities can largely ignore its
practical requirements. 12 They can operate with such a restrictive
definition of knowledge that the remedial obligation never kicks in. The
Comment to the Rule makes this "epistemological demurrer" even more
attractive by explaining that a "reasonable belief that evidence is false
does not preclude its presentation" and that "doubts about ...veracity"
should be resolved in favor of the client. 13 Although the Comment adds
that lawyers "cannot ignore an obvious falsehood," prudent practitioners
can generally avoid bumping into one. '4 Given the difficulties of proving
10. For a fuller elaboration of this view, see RHODE, JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 57, 6-7.
11. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2004).
12. In one poll, forty-one percent of attorneys believed that informing a court of clients'
perjury would violate those clients' rights to effective assistance of counsel. Lauren Rubenstein
Reskin, How Lawyers Vote on Tough EthicalDilemmas, ABA J., Feb. 1986, at 42.
13. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 8 (2004). For a critical view of the
"epistemological demurrer"--lawyers' asserted inability ever to "know" the truth-see Deborah L.
Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 618-20 (1985), and
FREEDMAN, ADVERSARY SYSTEM, supra note 1,at 51-58.
14. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 8 (2004). For a classic treatment of the
techniques, see KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS
AT WORK 103-23 (1985).
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actual knowledge of perjury, lawyers have run little risk of sanctions for
giving clients the benefit of some very large doubts.
Whether this is the best available compromise of competing
principles is an open question.15 Some commentators have suggested
that a better accommodation would be to follow the practice of other
countries that allow criminal defendants to make unsworn statements in
their own defense. But it is by no means clear how much would be
gained by moving in that direction or by enacting reforms that would
either strengthen or relax the obligations of lawyers. Whatever the
formal ethical rules, clients who intend to commit perjury will have
ample incentives to conceal it from attorneys. And attorneys whose
livelihood depends upon a trusting relationship with clients have ample
incentives to avoid knowledge requiring disclosure of their duplicity.
Moreover, in a system in which the vast majority of criminal cases end
in guilty pleas, and in which many defendants who do go to trial have
other reasons to avoid testifying, a change in ethical rules on perjury
may have limited practical effect. To be sure, modifying ethical
responsibilities could have some impact on how attorneys counsel
clients and how clients assess the value of proceeding to trial and taking
the stand. But as the subsequent discussion notes, the most fundamental
problems concerning client representation in the current criminal justice
system involve the inadequate resources and incentives for indigent
defense. Tinkering with largely unenforceable perjury rules pales in
comparison.
By contrast, other issues of client misconduct have provoked
continuing controversy and no stable, widely accepted compromises.
The American Bar Association's first Code of Professional
Responsibility (1969), and its initial version of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (1983), took a highly protective view of client
confidences, even in the face of substantial third party injuries.
Exceptions to the confidentiality obligations were quite limited. Both
documents required disclosure to prevent client perjury or other fraud on
a tribunal.' 6 The Code permitted disclosure only in one additional
circumstance: to enable lawyers to establish their own claims in a
controversy with a client, including efforts to collect a fee. The Model
Rules added only one further exception: to prevent the client from
15. See Monroe H. Freedman, Client Confidences and Client Perjury: Some Unanswered
Questions, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1939, 1939-40 (1988); Norman Lefstein, Client Perjury in Criminal
Cases: Still in Search of an Answer, I GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 521, 550 (1988).
16. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2004); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B) (1969).
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committing a criminal act that would result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm. 17 In other circumstances, involving noncriminal acts or serious financial injuries, attorneys' only recourse was
to withdraw from representation and to disavow prior statements that
might assist misconduct. In the case of organizational clients, lawyers
could also refer serious legal violations to the organization's highest
authority.' 8
From the profession's perspective, these rules held obvious appeal.
They gave lawyers maximum scope to protect their own interests and
those of paying clients. From a societal perspective, however, the norms
made little sense. If a less self-interested decision maker than the bar
had been responsible for adopting confidentiality rules, it seems
inconceivable that the ABA's formulations would have been the result.
Would anyone other than judges have required disclosure to prevent a
fraud on a court but not to save a life? Would anyone outside the bar
have permitted disclosures to help lawyers collect a modest fee but not
to prevent a massive health or financial disaster?' 9
Defenders of those rules often claimed that further limitations on
confidentiality would impair representation by causing clients to
withhold inculpating information. It is, however, not self-evident why
those individuals deserve maximum protection at the expense of more
innocent third parties whose physical or financial well-being depends on
disclosure. 20 Moreover:
Historical, cross-cultural, and cross-professional data make clear that
practitioners have long provided assistance on confidential matters
without the sweeping freedom from disclosure obligations that the
American bar has now obtained. Businesses routinely channeled
compromising information to attorneys before courts recognized a
corporate privilege, and most European countries manage without one
now.21

These difficulties in the bar's initial confidentiality standards have
not escaped attention. Over the last two decades, evidence of lawyers'
complicity in major health, safety, and financial scandals has fueled

17. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983).
18. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2004).
19. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 2, at 148-49; RHODE, JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 109;
Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1998).
20.
(1988).
21.

William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1142
RHODE, JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 111.
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continuing reform efforts. 22 By the turn of the twenty-first century, most
states had adopted exceptions to confidentiality protections beyond those
codified in the ABA's Model Rules.23 In 2002, the ABA itself modified
those rules to expand lawyers' discretion to disclose compromising
information. Most significantly, attorneys are now permitted to reveal
confidences necessary to prevent reasonably certain "death or substantial
bodily injury" even if no criminal act is involved.24 They may also act to
prevent, mitigate, or rectify client crimes or frauds reasonably certain to
result in financial injuries where their own services have been used.25
Yet the ABA, and the vast majority of state bars, have declined to
impose any mandatory disclosure obligations. Moreover, lawyers
representing organizations are permitted to reveal confidences or report
to the highest authority only in circumstances involving legal violations
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the organization,26
where the organization's best interest would be served by disclosure.
No responsibilities to third parties are acknowledged.2 7
That omission prompted Congress, in the aftermath of Enron, to fill
at least part of the gap. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 authorized the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to require lawyers
representing securities issuers to report material violations of the law to
supervisory officials within the organization. If these individuals fail to
take appropriate remedial action, lawyers are now obligated to notify the
organization's board of directors or designated board committee.28 In
promulgating regulations under that Act, the SEC considered requiring
lawyers to disclose possible legal violations to the Commission if the

22. Examples included the marketing of products such as asbestos, cigarettes, and the Dalkon
Shield, and financial disasters such as the collapse of savings and loan associations and Enron. See
id. at 108-09; see also DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 146, 255-63 (4th ed.

2004); Deborah L. Rhode & Paul Patton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, in ENRON: CORPORATE
FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 625 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004)
[hereinafter Rhode & Patton, Enron]; William H. Simon, The Kaye-Scholer Affair. The Lawyer's
Duty of Candor and the Bar's Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243,

243-44 (1998).
23. For a compilation of state standards, see ATr'YS' LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC'Y, INC., Ethics
Rules on Client Confidences, reprinted in THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 2004
SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 144-55 (2004).
24. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2004).

25. Seeid.atR.l.16.
26. IdatR.1.13.
27. For discussion of the indifference to third-party concerns in organizational contexts, see
Monroe H. Freedman, The "Corporate Watch Dogs " That Can't Bark: How the New ABA Ethical
Rules Protect CorporateFraud,8 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 225, 228 (2004).
28. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2003); 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 (2005).
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board failed to take effective action, but, in the face of overwhelming bar
opposition, the proposal was withdrawn.29
Whether these new requirements go too far or not far enough has
generated a cottage industry of commentary. And at this juncture, we
lack empirical evidence to adequately evaluate competing claims. What
little data are available concerning mandatory disclosure requirements in
state ethical codes suggest that such obligations are rarely invoked or
enforced in any publicly visible way.3 ° SEC requirements are likely to
have more bite, but how effective they will prove in practice remains
open to question. 3' The organized bar, however, seems intent on
researching only one side of the debate. The chair of a newly appointed
ABA Task Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege describes its mission
as collecting evidence that recent curtailment of confidentiality
32
protections are not in the best interests of corporations or the public.
That response raises a broader issue about the evolution of rules
governing advocacy and the process for their formulation. Recent history
29. One version of the noisy withdrawal rule appears at Implementation of Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 8150, Exchange Act Release No.
46,868, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,829, 67 Fed. Reg. 71,670, 71,704 (proposed Dec.
2, 2002). For discussion of opposition, see Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 8186, Exchange Act Release No. 47,282, Investment
Company Act Release No. 25,920, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324, 6325 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003). For the second
version of the proposal, see id. at 6328-29. The final rule does permit an attorney to make a noisy
withdrawal to prevent the issuer from committing a material violation that is likely to cause
substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or investors. 17 C.F.R.
§ 205.3(d)(2)(i) (2005). Many state confidentiality rules prohibit disclosure under such
circumstances, and the issue of whether federal regulations preempt state ethical codes is now under
dispute.
30.

See RHODE, JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 113.

31. The absence of external whistleblowing requirements and the standard of knowledge for
internal reporting obligations have been the subject of particular criticism. The obligation is
triggered under circumstances in which "it would be unreasonable... for a prudent and competent
attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely" that a violation has occurred, is occurring, or
will occur. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e) (2003). For criticism, see Roger C. Cramton et al., Legal and
Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REv. 725, 754 (2004), and see also
Keith R. Fisher, The Higher Calling: Regulation of Lawyers Post-Enron, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
1017, 1104 (2004); Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly 's Done: The Bar's Struggle with the
SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1236, 1274-76 (2003); William H. Simon, Wrongs ofignorance and
Ambiguity: Lawyer Responsibilityfor Collective Misconduct, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 31 (2005)
[hereinafter Simon, Wrongs]; Simon M. Lorne, The Perplexity and Perversity of the New Lawyer
Conduct
Rules,
WALL
ST.
LAW.,
June
2003,
available
at
http://
realcorporatelawyer.com/wsl/ws10603.html.
For competing concerns about the adverse effects of restricting confidentiality protections,
see Corporate Counsel: ABA Is Urged to Express Opposition to Government Incursions on
Privilege,21 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 303 (June 15, 2005).
32. Molly McDonough, Prove It: Task Force Seeks Evidence That Recent Policies
Undermine Attorney-Client Privilege,ABA J., Apr. 2005, at 60.
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leaves little doubt that the public has paid a substantial price for the ethic
of undivided client allegiance. 33 A growing constituency both within and
outside the profession is demanding that lawyers assume greater
responsibility for the welfare of parties other than clients.3 4 If attorneys
are unprepared to accept that responsibility, others are likely to impose it
on them. Despite intense opposition from the organized bar, Congress
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act with only three dissenting votes.35 If the
regulations that the statute authorizes prove inadequate, more stringent
requirements are sure to follow. As discussion in Part III makes clear,
the bar's own autonomy on issues of governance is subject to growing
challenge. If lawyers want to retain some measure of regulatory
independence, they need to strike a less self-interested balance of the
public, professional, and client interests at stake.
II.

ACCESS TO JUSTICE

Another central challenge of American legal ethics arises from the
disjuncture between the adversary system in principle and in practice.
The system's underlying premise, that accurate results will emerge from
partisan advocacy before a disinterested decision maker, depends on
factual assumptions that are out of touch with daily realities. The vast
majority of legal representation never receives oversight from an
impartial tribunal; little of lawyer's advice, negotiation, drafting, and
pretrial work obtains such scrutiny. Moreover, even cases that end up in
court seldom resemble the bar's theoretical model of adversarial
processes. That model presupposes opponents with roughly equal
incentives, information, resources, and capabilities. "But those
conditions [may be] more the exception than the rule in a society that
tolerates vast disparities in wealth, high litigation costs, and grossly

33. See sources cited supra note 22.
34. See, e.g., David Luban, Moral Meltdowns, in MORAL LEADERSHIP: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF POWER, JUDGMENT AND POLICY 57 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2006); John C. Coffee,

Jr., Gatekeeper Failureand Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L.
REv. 301, 363 (2004); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1294-95 (2003); Susan P. Koniak, Corporate Fraud:See, Lawyers, 26
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 195, 227 (2003); Simon, Wrongs, supra note 31, at 1-3, 35; Corporate
Counsel: Campos Urges Bond Attorneys to Engage in 'Self-Policing' and 'PreventiveLawyering',

21 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 463, 487 (Sept. 21, 2005).
35. See, e.g., Rhode & Patton, Enron, supranote 22, at 628.
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"In law, as in life, the haves

generally come out ahead.,

Obvious though this point seems, prevailing views of the
advocate's role fail to address its implications. According to the
Preamble of the ABA Model Rules, "when an opposing party is well
represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and
at the same time assume that justice is being done. 38 What happens
when the opposing party is not well represented is a matter that the
Rules largely overlook.
The problem of unequal access to justice, and the bar's reluctance
to address it, is longstanding. Early codes of ethics were, for the most
part, silent on the subject, except for some exhortatory provisions urging
attorneys to provide unpaid or reduced-fee assistance to the poor,
particularly the widows and orphans of "brother" lawyers.39 Until the
mid-twentieth century, the bar's support for subsidized legal services
was notable for its absence. The ABA initially opposed governmentfunded legal aid on the ground that it would pave the way for
"socialization" of the profession, and representative surveys found that
fewer than ten percent of lawyers contributed to the few available legal
assistance programs. 40 Bar support began to increase during the 1960s,
but it was largely confined to lobbying for state and federal subsidies.
Surveys of lawyers from the 1960s through the 1980s found that only
five to fifteen percent of practitioners provided pro bono assistance, and
most of the aid went not to the poor but to family, friends, employees,
and middle-class organizations. 41 The topic itself was largely ignored by
law schools and mainstream legal ethics writing until the last two
decades.42
36. RHODE, JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 55-56. For discussion of those disparities in criminal
contexts, see DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 11-12, 123-24 (2004) [hereinafter RHODE,
ACCESS]. For civil contexts, see id. at 13-14, 103-06.
37. For a more extended development of this argument, see RHODE, JUSTICE, supra note 7, at
56, and Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves " Come Out Ahead. Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95, 149 (1974).
38. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2004).
39. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25 (1980); CANONS OF PROF'L
ETHICS Canon 12 (1908).
40. RHODE, ACCESS, supra note 36, at 60; JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 236
(1976).
41. RHODE, ACCESS, supra note 36, at 66; RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 130
(1989); AUERBACH, supra note 40, at 282.
42. Although law schools offered clinics, externships and student-run public service activities
programs, it was not until the late 1980s that any significant number began to introduce formal pro
bono policies and administratively supported programs. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO BONO IN
PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE 21-22 (2005) [hereinafter RHODE, PRO BONO]. For an example of the
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For most of its history, not only did the American bar fail to
provide significant support for legal aid, it also promulgated
anticompetitive ethical rules that inflated the cost and reduced the
accessibility of legal services. Restrictions on advertising, solicitation,
minimum fees, unauthorized practice, and group legal services all helped
to price law out of reach for routine needs of most Americans.4 3
Although here again, bar attitudes grew more liberal during the late
1960s and 1970s, it generally took rulings by the courts to prompt
significant changes in restrictive ethical rules."
Over the last quarter century, much has changed. The issue of
unequal access is on the profession's agenda. At least three-quarters of
the states now have commissions focusing on the issue, and it is a
frequent topic of legal ethics commentary and reform efforts.45 Increases
in competition, information, and technological innovation have all
helped to reduce the costs of legal services and increase individuals'
capacity for self-representation. Two-thirds of lawyers now report
performing some pro bono work, broadly defined, for the poor or for
other bar or charitable organizations.4 6
Yet despite such progress, we remain a considerable distance from
the equality in legal representation on which the fairness of the
adversary system depends. It is a shameful irony that the nation with the
world's highest concentration of lawyers still does so little to make law
available to those who need it most. Less than one percent of the
nation's expenditures on legal services, about $2.25 per capita, goes to
support civil legal assistance for one-seventh of the population that is
poor enough to qualify for assistance. 47 At these funding levels, not
lack of coverage of pro bono responsibilities in influential early writing, see generally FREEDMAN,
ADVERSARY SYSTEM, supra note 1.
43. For an overview, see RHODE, ACCESS, supra note 36, at 69-76; ABEL, supra note 41, at
118; AUERBACH, supra note 40, at 41-48.

44. See RHODE, ACCESS, supranote 36, at 71-72; RHODE & LUBAN,supra note 22, at 729-89.
45. See, e.g., Supporting Partnerships to Expand Access to Justice ("SPAN"), Twelve Lessons
from Successful State Access to Justice Efforts 1-6 (Mar. 2003) (SPAN Working Paper, on file with
author).
46. ABA Standing Comm. on Pro Bono and Pub. Serv., Supporting Justice: A Report on the
Pro
Bono
Work
of America's Lawyers
4
(Aug.
2005),
available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/probono/report.pdf. The survey used the definition of pro bono
in the ABA Model Rule 6.1, and included assistance: to people of limited means or to organizations
that address the needs of the poor; activities for improving the legal system or the legal profession
through groups such as bar associations or judicial committees; and work for charitable, civic,
religious, educational, or other non-profit organizations. See id. at 10.
47. See RHODE, ACCESS, supra note 36, at 106. America spends only about $2.25 per person
on aid, a level one-sixth to one-fifteenth of that of other countries with comparable legal systems,
such as Canada, Australia, and Great Britain. See id. at 112.
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much due process is available. Bar estimates consistently find that over
four-fifths of the individual legal needs of the poor remain unmet.48
These estimates do not include the millions of Americans of limited
means who are above poverty thresholds, but cannot realistically afford
lawyers, or collective problems in areas like educational inequality or
the environment.
We also have not begun even to quantify, let alone address, the
inadequacies in indigent criminal defense. Recent research documents,
in dispiriting detail, reveal the vast gap between adversarial premises
and daily practices in the criminal justice system. Funds available for
indigent defense average one-eighth the amount available for
prosecution. 49 Many court-appointed attorneys lack the time, resources,
training, or incentives to mount an effective defense. Statutory fees and
caseloads are often set at ludicrous levels, which makes trial preparation
for most poor clients a statistical impossibility. 50 Over ninety percent of
indigent criminal defendants plead guilty without trial, typically before
any significant effort is made to investigate their case.51
The profession's response to inadequate representation has itself
been demonstrably inadequate. In criminal cases, the standards
governing effective assistance of counsel are a national embarrassment;
convictions have been upheld where defense lawyers have been asleep,
drunk, on drugs, or parking their cars for key portions of the
prosecution's case. 52 Even in capital cases, "[d]efendants have been
executed despite their [counsel's] lack of any prior trial experience,
ignorance of all relevant death penalty precedents, [and] failure to
present any mitigating evidence., 53 High costs and unrealistic standards
of proof make civil or disciplinary remedies for negligence largely

48. See id.
at 3.
49. See id.at 123; see also DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE 64, 84 (1999); Douglas
McCollum,
The
Ghost
of
Gideon,
AM.
LAW.,
Mar.
2003,
available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id= 1045793311608.
50. Hourly rates for out-of-court work are as low as $20 or $25, and ceilings of $1000 or
caseloads of five hundred felony matters are common. See RHODE, ACCESS, supra note 36, at 12;
Vivian Berger, Time for a Real Raise, NAT'L L.J., Sept 13, 2004, at 27; ABA Standing Comm. on
Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, Gideon's Broken Promise: America's Continuing Quest for
Equal Justice 7 (Dec. 2004) availableat http://www.indigentdefense.org.
51. See RHODE, ACCESS, supra note 36, at 124.
52. Seeid. at 13, 134-35.
53. Id. at 13, 140-41; see also COLE, supra note 49, at 87; Stephen B. Bright, Equal Justice
Under Law, IDEAS FOR AN OPEN SOC'Y (Open Soc'y Inst., New York, N.Y.), Mar. 2003, at 3,
availableat http://www.soros.org/resources/articles-publications/publications/ideas equaljustice_2
0030301/ideaspromiseequaljustice.pdf; TEX. DEFENDER SERV., LETHAL INDIFFERENCE, at ix
(2002), available at http://www.texasdefender.org/front.pdf.
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unavailable in criminal contexts, and few states have made efforts to
enforce guidelines on effective performance. 54
In civil contexts, the profession has too often been part of the
problem rather than the solution. On issues like procedural
simplification, pro se assistance, and non-lawyer services, courts have
been insufficiently proactive, and many bar organizations have been
actively resistant. In "poor peoples' courts" that handle housing,
bankruptcy, small claims, and family matters, parties without lawyers
are less the exception than the rule. Yet the system in which these parties
operate has been designed by and for lawyers, and neither courts nor bar
associations have pressed for reforms that would make it truly accessible
to everyone else. Innovative projects are in ample supply, but a majority
of surveyed courts have no formal pro se assistance services, and many
of the services that are available are inadequate for those who need help
most: litigants with limited education, financial resources, and English
language skills.55 Part of the problem lies with judges, who are reluctant
to encourage more time-consuming pro se litigation or to antagonize
lawyers, whose economic interests are threatened by self-help initiatives
and whose support is critical to judges' own effectiveness, election
campaigns, and advancement.5 6
Similar considerations have worked against efforts to broaden
access through non-lawyer providers of legal services. Almost all
scholarly experts and bar commissions that have systematically studied
the issue have recommended increased opportunities for qualified nonlawyer assistance; almost all state supreme courts and bar associations
have ignored those recommendations. 5 7 Rather than develop regulatory
and licensing systems that would protect consumers from injury, the bar
prefers to protect lawyers from competition. Like many of their state and

54. See RHODE, ACCESS, supra note 36, at 131-36, 143; Bruce A. Green, CriminalNeglect:
Indigent Defensefrom a Legal Ethics Perspective,52 EMORY L.J. 1169, 1169-70 (2003).
55. See RHODE, ACCESS, supra note 36, at 83.
56. See id.; Fisher, supranote 31, at 1116; Jona Goldschmidt, How Are Courts HandlingPro
Se Litigants?, 82 JUDICATURE 13, 19 (1998).

57. See RHODE, ACCESS, supra note 36, at 15, 82-83, 87-89; Deborah L. Rhode,
Professionalismin Perspective:Alternative Approaches to Nonlawyer Practice, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 701, 701 (1996) [hereinafter Rhode, Nonlawyer Practice];Deborah L. Rhode, The
Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 209, 233 (1990) [hereinafter
Rhode, Legal Services]. For other experts, see ABA COMM'N ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE,
NONLAWYER ACTIVITY IN LAW-RELATED SITUATIONS: A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS

(1995); Report of the State Bar of California Commission on Legal Technicians (July 1990)
[hereinafter California State Bar Commission Report].
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local counterparts, the ABA's governing body has voted to strengthennot reconsider-sweeping, unauthorized practice prohibitions.5 8
A final area of abdication by courts and bar associations involves
pro bono service. Proposed requirements have come and gone, but
mainly gone. Bar codes and state supreme courts have adopted only
aspirational standards, coupled in a few jurisdictions with voluntary or
mandatory reporting systems.59 Yet most lawyers have failed to meet
these standards. Law is the highest earning profession in the country, but
the best estimate of the bar's average pro bono contribution is under
half-an-hour a week, and half-a-dollar a day.6 ° Performance remains
pitiful even among the lawyers who could most readily afford to do
more. Only about a third of the attorneys in the nation's two hundred
largest and most financially successful firms provide at least twenty-five
minutes a week of pro bono service.61
Progress also remains to be made in law schools. Few issues are
more central to the American public and more peripheral to legal
education than access to justice. Pro bono service is embraced in
principle, but widely ignored in practice, and little discussion of the
distribution of services occurs outside of clinics. According to the most
recent data from the Association of American Law Schools (AALS),
only one-fifth of law schools require pro bono service of students, and
many of the obligations are modest: twenty to thirty hours spread over
lwi
with voluntary programs, AALS survey data
three years. 62 In schools
suggest that fewer than twenty percent of the students participate, and
average time commitments are quite limited.63 Some student
involvement is at token levels and seems intended primarily as resume
58. See Patricia Manson, Target Unauthorized Practice,ABA Urges, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
Feb. 14, 2000, at 1.
59.
60.

See RHODE, PRO BONO, supra note 42, at 15-18.
See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMP. & EARNINGS 251
(2005); see also RHODE, PRO BONO, supra note 42, at 20. The recent ABA survey results are not

inconsistent with this estimate, given that the average hourly contribution of lawyers who offered
pro bono assistance needs to be adjusted for the numbers who did not, and for those whose
contributions involved activities such as bar association service or assistance to middle-class
charities. See id.
61.

Aric Press, Brother, Can You Spare 20 Hours?, AM. LAW., Sept. 2005, available at

http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1125479112416
percent of lawyers provided twenty hours of assistance in 2004).
62.

(noting that only thirty-six

See THE AALS PRO BONO PROJECT, A HANDBOOK ON LAW SCHOOL PRO BONO

PROGRAMs 8-9 (2001); see also Cynthia F. Adcock, Fact Sheet on Law School Pro Bono Programs
(AALS, Feb. 20, 2003) (on file with author).
63.

AALS COMM'N ON PRO BONO & PUB. SERV. OPPORTUNITIES, LEARNING TO SERVE

(1999), available at http://www.aals.org/probono/report2.html [hereinafter AALS, LEARNING]; see
also RHODE, PRO BONO, supra note 42, at 24.
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padding. As an AALS Commission noted, a majority of law students
graduate without pro bono legal work as part of their educational
experience.6 4 Most schools remain a considerable distance from meeting
the Commission's recommendation that every institution "make
available to all law students at least once during their law school careers
a well-supervised law-related pro bono opportunity and either require
the students' participation
or find ways to attract the great majority of
65
students to volunteer.,
The gap between professional ideals and educational priorities
emerged clearly in my own recent survey of some three thousand
graduates of six law schools with different pro bono policies.66 One goal
of the study was to determine what legal education was doing, or should
be doing, to make future practitioners aware of the public's unmet legal
needs and the profession's duty to respond. Some survey findings speak
for themselves. Only one percent of the sample as a whole reported that
pro bono issues received coverage in law school orientation programs or
professional responsibility courses.6 7 Only three percent of graduates
observed visible faculty support for pro bono service.68 Surely we can,
and must, do better. Law schools have unique opportunities and
obligations to shape future practitioners' understandings of their
professional role. We cannot afford, as individuals or institutions, to
treat pro bono responsibilities as someone else's responsibility.

III. ACCOUNTABILITY
If, over the last quarter century, the central challenges of legal
ethics in an adversary system have remained unresolved, what can we do
to make greater progress over the next quarter century? What stands in
the way? The greatest obstacle, and the root of many others, is the lack
of accountability. Historically, the American legal profession has
enjoyed an exceptional level of independence in its own regulation. It
has drafted, adopted, and enforced codes of conduct without any
significant participation by non-lawyers. 69 Token lay members have not
64. AALS, LEARNING, supra note 63. Although some schools have recently strengthened their
pro bono programs, no evidence suggests that voluntary student involvement rates have changed
dramatically.
65. Id.
66. RHODE, PRO BONO, supra note 42, at 125.
67. Id.
at 162.
68. Id.
69. Only one non-lawyer served on the commissions that drafted the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and on the Ethics 2000 Commission
that recommended changes in the Model Rules. See RHODE, JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 16, 145-46.
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had the backgrounds, resources, leverage, or ties to consumer
organizations that could help create a counterweight to professional
dominance.
Professional independence is rooted in courts' assertion of inherent
authority to govern those who appear before them. This authority rests
on two premises: first, that the judiciary needs such control to ensure the
proper administration of justice, and second, that self-regulation
preserves the separation of powers and protects the bar from state
domination. 70 According to the Preamble of the Model Rules, "[a]n
independent legal profession is an important force in preserving
government under law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily
challenged by a profession whose members are not dependent on
government for the right to practice. 7 1
Yet this independence comes at a cost. The judiciary generally
lacks the time, incentives, resources, and managerial expertise to oversee
an effective governance structure. As noted earlier, because many
judges' reputations, advancement, and reelection depend on the bar's
support, they have reason, whether conscious or not, to avoid
undercutting its interests.72 Moreover, the prevalence of lawyers in the
legislative and executive branches has reduced the likelihood that either
will press for professional reform, particularly because the public
generally has not mobilized around the issue. The result leaves much to
be desired. Lawyers are hardly disinterested arbiters of their own
standards of conduct. If, as Roscoe Pound once put it, a bar organization
is not "the same sort of thing as a retail grocers' association," selfregulation brings out more of the similarities than the differences.73 No
vocational group, however well-intentioned, can make unbiased
assessments of the public interest on issues that place its own status,
reputation, and income directly at risk. The greater an occupation's
autonomy, the greater the risks of tunnel vision.74 The American legal
profession is no exception.
Non-lawyers also have only token representation on disciplinary bodies that enforce the rules. See
id.at 16, 145-46.

70.

For overviews and critiques of the inherent power doctrine and self-regulation more

generally, see Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should
Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts, Legislatures or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1171

(2003); Fisher, supra note 31, at 1106-20; Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the
Legalization of American Legal Ethics-lI The Modern Era, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 210-13

(2002).
71.
72.
73.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. cmt. 11 (2004).
See supratext accompanying note 56; see also Barton, supra note 70, at 1246.
ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 7 (1953).

74. See RHODE, JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 19-20, 212. For further discussion, see generally
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Over the last quarter century, the deficiencies in self-regulation
have attracted growing attention. Legislators, administrative agencies,
federal courts, and malpractice insurance companies have come to play
an increasing role in professional governance. They have supplemented
or supplanted bar standards in modest ways that coexist with the
judiciary's inherent governance powers. Academic experts, including
many in this symposium, have supported this development through
critical examination of the process and results of self-regulation.7 5
What has yet to emerge, however, is a coherent regulatory structure
with effective safeguards against both government domination and
professional self-interest. The increasing fragmentation of governance
authority has produced a patchwork of standards that, from the
profession's vantage, is often confusing and conflicting, and from the
public's vantage, is insufficiently responsive to societal concerns.
Devising an alternative is no small task, but the general direction
for reform should be obvious: more structural checks and public
accountability are necessary in the governance process. One promising
proposal would be to place authority for the development and
enforcement of ethical standards in independent national or state
regulatory commissions. Such commissions could strike a better balance
between professional autonomy and accountability than the current
system if their members were selected from diverse constituencies by
diverse legislative, judicial, and executive officials. Consumer regulation
experts, public interest organizations, and competing occupations, as
well as bar associations, should have representation among those
members. Such commissions could have jurisdiction over professional
codes in general or in specific areas of expertise.76
This regulatory framework could produce standards that are both
more protective of the public interest, and that make lawyers more
accountable for the consequences of their personal actions and
performance of adversarial processes. As I have suggested at greater
length elsewhere, a key feature of this framework is context. Ethical
standards need to be formulated and interpreted in light of all the societal
interests at issue in a particular practice setting. 77 Client trust and

Barton, supra note 70; IAN AYRES AND JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992).

75. The evolution of Monroe Freedman's work illustrates the trend. Compare FREEDMAN,
ADVERSARY SYSTEM, supra note 1 (lacking any mention of self-regulation), with FREEDMAN &
SMITH, supra note 2, at 2 (including discussion highly critical of the bar's autonomy).
76. See RHODE, JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 212; Fisher, supra note 31, at 1133-44.
77. See RHODE, JUSTICE, supranote 7, at 66-80, 113,213.
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confidentiality are entitled to weight, but they must be balanced against
other equally important concerns. Lawyers also have responsibilities to
prevent unnecessary harm to non-clients, to promote a just and effective
legal system, and to respect core values such as honesty, fairness, and
good faith on which that system depends. So, for example, lawyers
should be subject to greater disclosure obligations to protect crucial
health, safety, and financial interests of third parties. Attorneys who are
deciding whether to accept a client, withdraw from representation, or
report misconduct also need to assess their actions against a realistic
backdrop. They cannot simply retreat into role and assume some
idealized model of the adversarial process in which wealth, power, and
information are equally distributed, all interests are adequately
represented, and contested matters will reach a neutral decision maker.
The profession also must become more accountable for the
effectiveness of the justice system and the distribution of legal services.
At a minimum, that will entail greater efforts to make assistance
available, to expand its forms, and to ensure its quality. One obvious
strategy is for courts or bar ethical codes to require that lawyers make
modest pro bono contributions of time or money to programs for those
of limited means.78 A less controversial alternative would be to obligate
attorneys to report their contributions. Experience to date indicates that
such reporting rules have led to modest increases in the resources
available to legal services organizations. 79 Further improvements might
result if contribution rates were widely publicized, and if clients,
colleagues, and job candidates began paying more visible attention to
employers' pro bono records.
Other reform strategies should focus on improving the quality and
range of services now available for those of limited means. For indigent
criminal defense lawyers, courts and bar associations should enforce
minimum performance standards. Judges should be more willing to
overturn convictions for ineffective assistance of counsel and to find
constitutional violations where statutory fee ceilings and caseload
pressures prevent adequate representation. 80 For routine civil matters,
Americans deserve more accessible processes, and a wider range of

78. For an argument supporting such a requirement, see RHODE, PRO BONO, supra note 42, at
26-49, 172-73.
79. See id. at 167-68.
80. See RHODE, ACCESS, supra note 36, at 143. For an example, see New York County
Lawyers' Ass'n v. Pataki, 727 N.Y.S.2d 851, 853 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001). For similar proposals, see
Monroe H. Freedman, An Ethical Manifesto for Public Defenders, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 911, 921-23
(2005).
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options in law-related assistance. Less protection should be available for
the professional monopoly and more for individual consumers.
Licensing or certification systems for non-lawyer providers could
require basic competence, compliance with ethical standards, and
malpractice insurance.81 More courts could institutionalize reforms that
reduce costs, complexities, and injustices resulting from unequal
resources. Promising examples include: personal and on-line
multilingual help for pro se litigants; simplified forms and proceedings
available in community as well as courthouse sites; and less adversarial
problem-solving tribunals with expanded social service resources.8 2
Equal justice under law is what we pledge on courthouse doors. It should
also describe what goes on inside them.
Finally, law schools need to be more accountable for their own
efforts, or lack of efforts, concerning professional responsibility. Issues
of legal ethics, access to justice, and pro bono service are too often
missing or marginal in core curricula. 83 Equally troubling gaps are
apparent in research priorities. On key questions involving professional
roles, rules, and regulation, our knowledge base is shamefully thin. We
are awash in theory and starved for facts. Too much professional
responsibility scholarship is data-free doctrinal analysis, the functional
equivalent of "geology without the rocks. 84
Moreover, too little of the work that could be useful in reform
efforts is directed toward the public, or to the media that shape popular
attitudes and policy agendas. Like other academics, legal ethics scholars
write mainly for each other, and in forms that are not accessible to lay
audiences. Partly as a result, most Americans are poorly informed on
issues involving regulation of lawyers and access to justice. For
example, public opinion surveys reveal widespread misunderstanding
about attorneys' disclosure obligations and the quality and accessibility
of legal representation for the poor.85 Yet attempts to educate the public
are, for most academics, an unrewarding and unrewarded task. Except
81. See RHODE, ACCESS, supra note 36, at 90-91; RHODE, JUSTICE, supranote 8, at 137-38.
82. See RHODE, ACCESS, supra note 36, at 86.
83. See RHODE, JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 201 (providing that part of the reason is that
casebooks outside the field of professional responsibility offer little coverage of such issues).
84. The phrase comes from Lawrence Friedman. See PAUL WICE, JUDGES AND LAWYERS:
THE HUMAN SIDE OF JUSTICE 16 (1991).

85.

For confidentiality and disclosure obligations, see Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking

Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 375 (1989). For perceptions about the poor's right to counsel

in civil cases and their ability to find assistance, see RHODE, ACCESS, supra note 36, at 4 (noting,
for example, that four-fifths of Americans mistakenly believe that indigent civil litigants have a
right to representation). For misperceptions about the ability of criminal defendants to get off on
technicalities, see ABA, PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM 66 (1999).
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for the relatively few scholars with access to the national media, law
school professors have inadequate incentives to write for non-legal
audiences or to spend significant time assisting journalists who do. It is
far safer to produce some deeply theorized but practically irrelevant
tome than to risk dismissal as a mere "popularizer." A significant
commitment to professional reform will require a corresponding
adjustment in academic reward structures. Faculties need more
resources, training, and incentives to pursue time-consuming empirical
projects and to address broader audiences.
Law schools also need to be more accountable for their pro bono
programs. Although ABA accreditation standards require schools to
provide appropriate public service opportunities for students and to
encourage service by faculty, many institutions neither keep nor disclose
specific information concerning participation rates. 86 Such information,
or compliance with minimum standards, could be required as part of the
accreditation process, or as a condition for AALS membership. Schools
that meet the best practice standards could also be given recognition in
media surveys and in publications of the AALS, ABA, and public
interest organizations. Such practices could include: adequate pro bono
policies and resources; integration of materials on access to justice and
public service responsibilities in the core curriculum; and requirements
by law school placement offices that legal employers provide detailed
information about their own pro bono programs and participation rates.
In an academic culture increasingly driven by competitive rankings
and economic constraints, it is all too easy for legal educators to lose
sight of broader social responsibilities. Law schools cannot be valueneutral on questions of value. One of their most crucial functions is to
force focus on the way that legal structures function, or fail to function,
for the have-nots. Another is to equip and inspire students to contribute
to the public good and to reflect more deeply on what that means in
professional contexts. Faculty who teach legal ethics have a particular
obligation to prod professional schools to live up to their own
professional responsibilities. I am grateful to join part of a symposium
reminding us of that role and honoring a colleague whose life reflects
our highest ethical traditions.

86. See ABA SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE B., STANDARDS AND RULES OF
PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS § 302(e) (2005).
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

PROFESSOR SIMON: Thank you very much, Deborah.
PROFESSOR WECHSLER: Steven Wechsler from Syracuse Law
School. One of the problems that you mention is what law schools can
do. And one of the movements that I think we have seen recently in law
schools is to require pro bono of our students. The problem that I have
observed here is that we don't require it of lawyers. The ABA has not
invoked mandatory pro bono. I am not aware of any other jurisdiction,
statewide jurisdiction, that has. And the suggestion when made that law
students should be required to do mandatory pro bono is often met with
the response that, well, why should we do it-why should we make our
students do it if lawyers are only encouraged? And I wondered if you
could address that and help us with a way to get law students to do pro
bono.
PROFESSOR RHODE: I'm delighted to comment, especially since
I have just written a book on the subject, Pro Bono in Principle and
Practice, out in paperback from Stanford Press.87 It includes a
comprehensive summary of research and results from a survey of some
3000 lawyers who graduated from schools with different types of pro
bono programs. What it indicates is that about one-fifth of law schools
now require pro bono service by students. Most of the rest have
voluntary programs which are estimated to get maybe a third of students
to volunteer. So less than half of all law students are actually involved.
And even in the schools that require service, the number of hours is
often very small: twenty hours, for example, over the course of three
years. So some of the volunteering seems more designed for resumepadding than real effective service.
One of the goals of the study that I mentioned in the talk was to
discover whether it makes a difference if schools have robust mandatory
requirements. Do their graduates, in fact, do more pro bono in the world
outside, or do workplace constraints really trump what happens in law
school? Basically, what I found, which is consistent with most other
literature on volunteering, is that having a positive experience with some
sort of public interest causes or legal aid during school years does
increase people's desire for that kind of experience later in life. But you
don't have to have that experience in a pro bono program. And you don't
necessarily have it in a law school that has a mandatory program if the
program isn't well run and well supported with a wide variety of

87. See RHODE, PRO BONO, supra note 42.
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placement options and good supervision. So my own recommendation
for law schools is that they should set up either a mandatory program or
a series of volunteer programs and figure out ways to get the vast
majority of students to participate.
And I think that there are educational justifications for getting
students to be in a clinic or in a pro bono program where they see how
the law functions or fails to function for the have-nots. They can learn a
particular set of skills, they bump right up against ethical problems, and
they have an opportunity to connect the law with life in ways that much
of their other classroom work doesn't allow. So I think you can make an
independent educational justification for a pro bono requirement, but I
don't think it's the requirement that's the essential piece. Some schools
with well supported voluntary programs, Yale is one that I studied, have
a lot of opportunities, including clinics where law professors are
involved, and that approach is highly valuable. Public service in these
schools is rewarding and rewarded. You get very high levels of
participation. So my goal is to see more schools move in that direction.
That's what Stanford is trying to do. But for the vast majority of law
schools, we've got quite a distance to go.
It also turns out that having faculty role models is a good thing,
which is one reason why the Stanford Ethics Center is setting up a
website matching service that is going to make it easier for professional
responsibility professors to do pro bono work in their areas of specialty.
If students see such work and they hear professors talk about it in class,
that really legitimates it. Law faculty need to assume more responsibility
for that kind of role modeling even in the absence of requirements for
practicing lawyers.
PROFESSOR WECHSLER: Thank you very much, I look forward
to the book.
DEAN TWERSKI: Aaron Twerski. In addition to living my life as
a law professor, for reasons unbeknownst to me I serve as a guru in our
community and I get telephone calls at all hours of the day and night.
And the one area that you sort of touched on strikes home and that is the
ability to get counsel for people in domestic relations disputes. It is just
awful. People with very serious child custody and divorce problems
cannot get counsel. I mean, they call me, I try to do it. There is no place
to turn. I recently had a meeting with Nassau County judges with regard
to our involvement of our family law program and the L.L.M. program.
And I forget the statistics of the number of pro se litigants, but it was
horrendous. I mean, it was just a small percentage that were really
represented by attorneys. The situation there, it seems to me, is far worse
https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol34/iss3/2

22

Rhode: Legal Ethics in an Adversary System: The Persistent Questions
2006]

THE PERSISTENT QUESTIONS

than in the criminal area where at least facially there is some
responsibility to do it. I don't know if your experience has shown the
same thing, but it's devastating.
PROFESSOR RHODE: Well, you are absolutely right and, in fact,
the other pivotal event in my own career that sent me down the legal
ethics path was working in a legal aid clinic in law school. I was in the
family law unit and the clinic did intake one morning a month. If you
were a poor person who needed a lawyer and you didn't show up on that
one morning, you were out of luck. At the time, the cost of a lawyer in
Connecticut for preparing three uncontested divorce forms essentially
was what would now be about $2200, so it was just not plausible for
most poor people to hire counsel. And when the legal aid office wanted
to put out a kit for the people who could represent themselves, which
was some fraction of our low income group, the local bar association
said: "We will sue you for unauthorized practice." The supervising
lawyer came to me because he had never heard of that doctrine and
asked, "Can the bar do that?"
So I went off and did some research and that was my first law
review article on the subject. I'm still writing about it thirty years later
because the bar still is suing non-lawyers; it's given up the ghost on
suing over kits. Now in many family law courts, in about eighty percent
of cases, at least one side is unrepresented. Some of these people get
form-processing assistance from non-lawyers. A few get it from courtorganized programs. A lot more are getting it from online services. But
they are all grossly inadequate. A large percentage of really poor people
can't use the online help by themselves without assistance. Oftentimes,
what little courthouse support is available is not useful for those who
lack good English language skills or who aren't computer friendly. So
there is just an enormous need that some jurisdictions are really trying to
figure out how to meet more effectively. So you are beginning to see
more pilot projects in family courts that have in-house pro se assistance
programs that will walk people through the process and provide some of
the counseling they need. Some have lawyers who offer the service
voluntarily, but the matrimonial bar has not been very forthcoming on
pro bono assistance because they don't want to get enmeshed in a lot of
non-paying cases. Too many of their own cases turn out to involve more
time than they can bill for. So family law is an area where enormously
critical needs remain unmet. A related area is domestic violence, which
is also involved in many of these divorce cases. Forms for getting a
temporary restraining order are just beyond the capacity of many people
to complete without assistance, and we have done far too little to make
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other forms of legal services accessible. So I am glad you flagged the
problem and it's an area where I really think the law schools should be
pioneering reform efforts.
MR. BEASLEY: My name is John Beasley. I have two questions
about structure. And the answer may be: "That's a good question." But
the first question is about plea bargaining and access and the ethics of
that whole situation; whereas, for example, we have elected district
attorneys here in Nassau. And the question, the ethical question I see: if
they bring numerous charges higher than perhaps the evidence and they
bring the person in and the structure is not geared to really give everyone
a trial-if you have any thoughts about that?
And the second question is about the structure of the whole political
system, as you referred to-it's almost totally dominated by lawyers.
And it goes far beyond what you suggest. It goes to the very level of the
political district; the political assembly district has a lawyer. And they
control who can register and they get involved with the fights in the
court. So the question there of ethics is, I'm going to jump and say: Who
is the lawyer representing when he is representing an elected official?
Who is the client? And what happens to the ethics as of today when he
gets up and he has to answer questions? What does that all mean on a
daily basis? That question, of course, is a little large. But in school
districts, in the fire department, they all have lawyers and they are all
there on-so, thank you.
PROFESSOR RHODE: Both of those are really good and difficult
questions. The first problem is what to do about the enormous amount of
prosecutorial discretion in a system which provides inadequate
representation to the other side. And that's a particular problem in a
context where overcharging has been routine. What happens when you
don't have defense lawyers able to provide the kind of zealous advocacy
and factual investigation necessary to negotiate a plea that's reasonable
under the circumstances? And where the prosecutor has political
motivations, obviously, the risks of abuse are much higher. I don't think
there are any quick fixes. Investing more in indigent criminal defense,
providing more oversight to make sure that criminal defense attorneys
are, in fact, doing the job, and establishing more accountability
structures, are part of the answer. Obviously, trying to figure out ways to
rein in prosecutors is important, too. Some of the most recent research
suggests that in a sample of two hundred cases of reported prosecutorial
misconduct which was serious enough to warrant reversal on appeal,
only one case resulted in any formal sanctions by a bar disciplinary
organization. And only two resulted in informal sanctions by the local
https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol34/iss3/2
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district attorney's offices that were in charge of those individuals. So
figuring out ways to make prosecutors more accountable is, I think, key
as well.
On the question of who the lawyer for the public official represents,
does the lawyer represent the "public" or the official who is directly
implicated by the legal proceeding? That's an issue that requires a highly
contextualized inquiry. As a general matter, most government attorneys
seem to think that they're representing those officials who are most
directly implicated by the dispute. But if they get into a situation in
which they think those individuals have committed legal violations or
are in other ways misleading the court or disserving their agencies, then
I think the lawyer has an obligation to serve the taxpayers who are
footing the bill. What that entails is a contextual judgment. You can't
make abstract rules that capture it. But I think lawyers for public entities,
no less than those for private clients, do have some obligation to think
about the broader public interest. That is particularly the case in contexts
in which the lawyer is de facto being hired by the public to represent its
interests, not those of particular occupants of an elected office.
PROFESSOR APPLEMAN: Hi, I'm Laura Appleman. I'm visiting
at Hofstra this year. As someone who very recently left private practice
of indigent criminal defense in New York City and moved to the
academy, I strongly agree with you that there is a big problem in the
representation you get. In fact, another problem you mentioned, I just
did a study looking at specifically why in New York City the
representation there is so bad. And you sort of think New York City
would be a great place, but it's terrible. And I have three main reasons,
two of which you talked about.
The first, of course, is just money. There is not enough funding and
the lawyers don't want to-the lawyers on the New York bar don't want
to pay for any more. Second is both oversight and then lack of training.
A lot of appointed defense counsel just really doesn't know what it's
doing. But the third point I really looked at was the toothless standards
promulgated really by the Supreme Court about what is ineffective
assistance of counsel. Because Strickland8 is basically we have this law
and it's been interpreted by most courts, including the New York Court
of Appeals, as something that basically you can sleep through a trial.
And so I just don't think this has to be so. In fact, this past week in the
Ninth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit found an attorney ineffective assistance
using the Strickland standard, suddenly resolved that thing, ten to one,
88. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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suddenly raising the standard. So my question to you is even if the
judiciary doesn't have time to do all this oversight, is one way the
judiciary could get involved at least with criminal defense is just to
really put the teeth back in something like Strickland?.
PROFESSOR RHODE: Absolutely. And I think you can read in
that decision plenty of doctrinal room to impose appropriate standards.
Courts could also work with bar association agencies to make sure that
they're implementing appropriate oversight mechanisms. Another
strategy is for courts to uphold constitutional claims brought on a
system-wide basis for failure to provide sufficient funding. Although
those suits have generally gone down the tubes, in a few cases that have
involved really egregious violations, the courts have found a need for
constitutional remedies and the legislature has reluctantly anteed up the
necessary funds. Georgia is one state which was forced into a massive
overhaul and it still by no means has a perfect system. But it's better,
partly because of media exposes of one after another lawyer meeting
clients for five minutes or giving out phone numbers where you never
could get anything but the answering machine saying that the lawyer
was otherwise engaged. So part of the answer is a combination of courts
sticking their necks out and a public that is educated and somewhat
energized. We can be of help as legal educators with both solutions. We
can provide pro bono assistance to legal challenges and we can work
with the media to try to get more coverage. Those strategies helped in
New York. The [New York] Times did a good series that encouraged an
increase in fees for indigent defense attorneys. But hourly rates are still
an embarrassment. Kids selling soda on the beach do better than courtappointed counsel in many jurisdictions. So there is a lot of work still to
be done.
PROFESSOR WOLFRAM: I'm Charles Wolfram, Professor
Emeritus at Cornell. But the question is, on your first theme of client
autonomy, what reform-twenty-five seconds or less-would your rule
look like on a lawyer's permissible disclosure of anything troubling in
the representation or otherwise?
PROFESSOR RHODE: Well, I can't really do it in twenty-five
seconds, Charles. So I'm going to just fight the question. But you still
get credit for doing what we were enjoined to do at the beginning, which
is to ask the right question. I spend a chapter in a book I wrote called, In
the Interests of Justice, on exactly these kinds of issues-"hard cases" I
called them.8 9 And I think they require contextual judgments. Lawyers
89.

See RHODE, JUSTICE, supra note 7.
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have to balance clients' legitimate confidentiality needs against
competing values. I would like a rule that would capture a wider range
of considerations regarding harm to third parties. For example, I would
give lawyers discretion to disclose to prevent serious, imminent risks to
third parties. That would help take into account cases like those
involving Dalkon Shields and asbestos. It's clear that lawyers in those
cases knew about product safety violations that the public needed to be
aware of. I would also impose more mandatory disclosure obligations.
Right now, exceptions to confidentiality rules in most jurisdictions don't
go far enough to protect innocent third parties. One reason is that
lawyers are terribly worried about civil liability. I'm less concerned. I
think juries would sort out pretty quickly what is in the public interest in
terms of lawyers' disclosure obligations. So I would be prepared to live
with a little bit more accountability for the profession. And certainly, we
could use a few small moves in that direction. Sarbanes-Oxley is a
nudge in the right direction, but I don't think the standard I read earlier
is going to prove adequate. That rule wouldn't even have dealt with
lawyers in Enron, which is what the legislation was designed to deal
with.
PROFESSOR DERSHOWITZ: My question follows up on that you
pointed to the dichotomy between the TV image of guilty people being
freed on technicalities and what you call the real-time image, I guess, of
innocent defendants being convicted. My job and the job of criminal
defense attorneys is mostly to increase the former; that is, to get guilty
people acquitted on technicalities or on any other ethical or legal basis
possible. And that very often conflicts with third-party interests, the
interest of victims, the interest of witnesses, the interest of police, the
interest in faith in the system. It's difficult enough to teach students and
young lawyers to do everything they can zealously, consistently with
ethics, to win for their guilty clients. That's so counterintuitive. It's so
hard. Don't you add a level of confusion when you ask them also to take
into account third-party or public interests? Doesn't that inherently
provide an excuse for mediocrity or laziness? I have heard so many bad
lawyers defend their lack of zealousness on the ground: "I was just
protecting the third-party." How do you avoid sending that mixed
message?
PROFESSOR RHODE: Well, I'm one of these people who believe
that civil and criminal cases are different and that part of our job is to
educate both our students and the public to understand the difference.
When lawyers are representing criminal defendants whose lives, liberty
and reputation are at risk, the lawyers' obligation is to make sure the
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system works whether or not the defendants are guilty or innocent. In a
system like ours, which relies on plea bargains, it's important that the
cases that go to trial ensure that law enforcement agencies do their job
properly within constitutional limits. If you don't have lawyers holding
police and prosecutors to that standard, making them provide proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, adhere to the rules of evidence and respect
constitutional safeguards, then you won't have a system which convicts
only the guilty. So there is a systemic justification for criminal defense
lawyers' zealous advocacy and a principle on which you can fault
lawyers for failing in that obligation. We need to teach about those
lawyers who don't want to go to sleazy bars to look for witnesses
because after all, they think their clients are guilty. You can't run an
effective criminal justice system that way. But I don't think lawyers for
civil defendants should have the same latitude and be able to fall back on
the same justification for unqualified advocacy. So that's how I draw the
line. And I think that's a distinction you can educate the public about.
You can get them to think about what they would want for themselves or
their loved ones if they were accused of the crime. And it's not
necessarily what they would want for the maker of the Dalkon Shield.
So that's my goal. I think your own work has done a very good job of
educating the public about why we need zealous criminal defense
attorneys. Unfortunately, I think too many Americans believe there are
too many like you who are out there which, alas, there aren't enough of.
MS. RINGLER: I'm Robyn Ringler. I was fortunate enough to be a
former student of Professor Freedman and Dean Twerski. I graduated
from Hofstra in 1987. I want to talk about access to lawyers in the
family court and matrimonial, domestic violence and custody cases. I
wonder if you ever consider the factor of fear by regular lawyers. I'm
coming to this from the point of view of being just a plain old lawyer in
civil litigation who has never stepped foot in a family court before, and
who has heard that matrimonial cases, custody cases, domestic violence
cases are very difficult, kind of scary. And I did recently finish a CLE
course in representing domestic violence victims, so I am going to start
taking part in that as a pro bono project up in Albany, where I live. But I
think that fear maybe needs to be studied, people who really aren't
familiar with that type of law. Maybe the way they got me drawn in is
they, the women running this group put out literature and promised to be
there for questions, promised to back you up. They provided malpractice
insurance. They gave you a free CLE all-day, wonderful seminar, free
books. It was all under a grant. But I think fear is an issue.
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PROFESSOR RHODE: You know, your example points to exactly
what we need more of. And we can do it in the law schools, too. My
own school just set up a pro bono domestic violence clinic. We brought
in trainers, we provided workshops, we got people on-call to answer
questions. New York actually has a wonderful support service for
volunteers, Pro Bono Net, which is on the web. 90 If you're a subscribing
member and you're doing pro bono work in a number of areas including
matrimonial law, you get electronic access to huge resources. There are
chat boards. You can post questions. You get answers. There are places
you can call. Although factual situations in these cases can be complex,
oftentimes what the parties need legally is not rocket science. You can
easily train people to complete these forms. You can train them in the
matrimonial cases. It's not the legal, technical aspects that are really
what make the cases hard.
MS. RINGLER: But the thing is to get the word out there to other
attorneys in different areas that you will be supported and it's not as hard
as you might think.
PROFESSOR RHODE: Yes, and that's what bar associations
should be doing, God love them, and I wish there were more of them
doing it. So you have got a good project going. We as legal academics
can also do more to spread the word. Any time I am asked to do a CLE
program, I say, "Can I talk about pro bono?" which is typically not the
subject that they want. But when I speak on pro bono opportunities, I
always get sign-ups at the end. And so nudging lawyers every chance we
get to is key.
PROFESSOR POWELL: Professor Rhode, Deborah, I would like
to give you an opportunity to say something about that-well, at least to
expand on that, to the lady's suggestion, that we perhaps would be better
off if we had a different way of organizing the regulation of lawyers.
Presently we have a model which is essentially a national forum
sponsored by the ABA or some other such entity. They come up with a
model rule. They invite everybody who has even a brief idea to come in
and participate in it. And then whatever comes out of that is presented as
a model to all the jurisdictions. And then you go through the process
again from top to bottom with debate and everybody brought in to
participate. You seem to be suggesting, or at least I think I heard you
clearly suggesting, that a different kind of model might work. And I'm
trying to figure out what that other model is likely to get us. It seems to
me that if you have more democratization of the regulation, that you are
90. See http://www.probono.net/.
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at least likely to get some sentiments that are reflected by the general
population. Fees would, of course, be lower, but you would have a
dampening down on controversial issues as they affect gays and
minorities. You would have an obligation for the profession to take on
more responsibility for protecting the poor, lower taxes, put the
obligation on lawyers to provide representation in these various areas,
things like that. Is that a good thing?
PROFESSOR RHODE: Well, first of all, let me be clear. I don't
believe democratizing the drafting process is what we want: we should
not have rules adopted by plebiscite. But neither is it enough just to let
the public have a few opportunities for comments on rules that will be
adopted by the ABA House of Delegates, which is all lawyers. There
was only one non-lawyer on each of the ABA commissions that did the
drafting of the two most recent model ethical codes. And then these
codes were adopted by state judiciaries, which again means former
lawyers regulating lawyers. So there is not much public involvement in
the process. In California, some of us were invited to submit legislation
for an alternative regulatory structure after a huge scandal involving bar
disciplinary processes. What we proposed was an expert commission
with appointed members by different groups: the speaker of the state
legislature, the governor, the bar association, and so forth. The group
would be broadly representative, and it would include consumer
regulation experts. It would also have law professors and members of
competing professions like accountants. So the notion was that you
would have a broader base than the organized bar to make
recommendations on what the ethical rules and the enforcement
structures would look like. I still think that that would get you to a better
place than the current regulatory system. And you know, it might result
in some of the things that you pointed out that don't seem to me to be
self-evidently wrong, like a tax on legal fees to support legal services.
Given most lawyers' income levels, if you make that tax progressive
enough, I'm not against it. But I do recognize that you don't want to just
throw all issues about ethical rules to the masses because they don't have
the expertise to make informed judgments about how the governance
system should run.
PROFESSOR POWELL: Well, I do need to add a footnote that that
California system that you describe came about in part because the
governor was mad at the legal profession and wanted to do some things
that basically defame it.
PROFESSOR RHODE: What I described came in response to an
earlier scandal. That governor's efforts didn't result in our proposal. And
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you are right, he was pretty self-interested and nothing good came of his
recommendation. So thank you very much. [Applause]
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